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a clear conflict with local law there may be neither a well-settled
principle of law nor decisions available for reference. In the
instant case the Court resolved questions concerning instructions to the jury not passed on by the court of appeals, 26 and
denied itself and counsel the benefits of briefs and oral argument. The Court assigned no reason for its action, leaving the
parties uninformed as to the basis upon which their rights were
adjudicated. Such a situation may easily lead to confusion as
to the state of the law, 27 and lower federal court judges may

encounter difficulty in determining a course of action in similar
cases. One Texas appellate court has chosen to ignore the Supreme Court's reversal of the court of appeals in the instant
case and to cite the latter with approval. 28 It is submitted that
except in extraordinary instances the judgments of the courts of
appeals in diversity cases should be left undisturbed. If a case
is of such a nature as to warrant consideration by the Supreme
Court, a full disposition should be accorded. If, however, the
Court finds it necessary to resort to the per curiam device, it is
submitted that some indication should be given as to the legal
principles upon which the decision is founded.
Henry A. Politz
INSURANCE - AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE - CONSTRUCTION OF THE TERM "INSURED" IN EMPLOYEE AND
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EXCLUSIONS

Mitchell, while loading Southern's truck, negligently killed
an employee of Southern, the name insured in a liability policy
on the truck. Plaintiff, spouse of deceased, sued Employer's
Liability Assurance Corporation as the insurance carrier on the
26. See note 5 supra.
27. Mr. Justice McReynolds, Hearing8 Before Committee by Judiciary on H. R.
8206, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1925) : "To me it seems that the real function of
our Court is this: to settle the law, so that lawyers may know how to advise their
clients and so that trial judges may know how to instruct their juries or how to
decide cases that come before them."
28. Nance Exploration Co. v. Texas Employers' Ins. Assoc., unreported, 1957:
"True it is that the Supreme Court of the United States, in a very recent per
curiam opinion (1 L. Ed.2d 77), without giving any rhyme or reason for its action, set aside the holding of the Circuit Court in this case ....
It is impossible
to determine from the Supreme Court opinion why it took this action. It cannot
be determined if it thought the Texas law was wrong, or if it thought that the
Fifth Circuit had wrongly applied it. Be that as it may, we are not bound by
Federal decisions in this case. On the contrary, Federal courts are supposed to
follow State decisions . . . . We consider the Fifth Circuit opinion well reasoned
and in accord with the Texas decisions, by which we are governed. Federal cases
are used by us as persuasive, but not decisive. In this case, we choose to cite with
approval the Fifth Circuit's opinion."

NOTES

19571

truck and Mitchell as an additional insured under the omnibus
clause of the policy. Southern's workmen's compensation insurer
had made compensation payments to plaintiff. Employer's denied liability, relying on the employee and workmen's compensation exclusions, which read:
"This policy does not apply:
"(c) . .. to any obligation for which the insured or any
company as his insurer may be held liable under any workmen's compensation law:
"(d)

...to bodily injury to... or death of any employee

of the insured ...."
The court of appeal affirmed the denial of recovery by the district court and held that the term "insured" as used in these exclusions applies to both the named and additional insured collectively. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held, reversed. The
term "insured" applies to the named and additional insureds
severally and not collectively. The employment relationship between the named insured and the person injured is immaterial,
when the tort is committed by an additional insured. In such a
case, the relationship between the injured party and the additional insured determines whether the exclusionary clauses preclude recovery. Pullen v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corp.,
330 La. 867, 89 So.2d 373 (1956).
The term "insured" as used in liability policies is utilized
both to extend and to restrict coverage. The omnibus clause
creates additional insurance in favor of third parties by extending coverage to users of the vehicle as well as to those responsible
for such use.' The unqualified term "insured" includes any person within this defined group, thereby extending coverage.2 Be1. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Mackechnie, 114 F.2d 728 (8th
Cir. 1940) (omnibus clause does not merely afford additional protection to car
owner) ; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Mann, 73 F.2d 465 (4th Cir.
1934) (it creates liability insurance for the benefit of those who come within the
clause); American Fidelity Co. v. Deerfield Valley Grain Co., 43 F. Supp. 841
(D.C. Vt. 1942) (provided the additional insured is not within the cross-employee
exception to the clause as when an employee kills or injures another employee of
the same employer) ; Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Bear, 220 Ala. 491,
125 So. 676 (1929) (provided they are in a position to become legally liable for
injury to others) ; Government Personnel Automobile Ass'n v. Haag, 131 S.W.2d
978 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) (even though they pay no premiums to insurer for
protection).
2. The omnibus clause provides: "The unqualified word 'insured' includes the
named insured and also includes .. . (2) . . .any person while using an ... auto-

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XVIII

sides the omnibus coverage most policies carry exclusionary
clauses which are inserted in the policy to withdraw from coverage some specific risks, thereby permitting a reduction in
premiums.3 The term "insured" in clauses of this kind has been
construed both severally, that is, as referring only to the relationship between the person against whom claim is made and
the injured person, and collectively, as referring to the relationship between either the named or an additional insured and the
injured person.4 Thus, the collective construction precludes coverage where an additional insured injures either an employee
of the named insured5 or an employee of another additional inmobile ... and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof,
provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or with his
permission. ..."
3. VANCE, INSURANCE 427 (3d ed. 1951) ; APPLEMAN, AUTOMOBILE Insurance
196, 197 (1938): "This exclusion [workmen's compensation exclusion] is one
definitely warranted and justified in law. The insurance company does not include
this type of a risk in computing rates and no premium is charged to cover this
protection. There is a definite increase of hazard in this type of case which would
necessitate a higher premium rate for its inclusion. Rather than penalize all
policyholders for the increased risk of a few, since the great majority have no
employees, . . . it is felt wiser to exclude protection for such injuries altogether.
The insured can secure protection against this liability through a workmen's compensation insurance policy- or if there is no Compensation Act in that state, an
employer's liability insurance policy. Then he is bearing the burden of the increased hazard individually and not shifting it on to hundreds of other policyholders whose risk is much more restricted."
4. The courts are divided as to the proper construction. The following eases
adopt the collective construction: Getlin v. Maryland Cas. Co., 196 F.2d 249 (9th
Cir. 1952) ; State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 136 F.2d 807 (8th
Cir. 1943) ; Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 104 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1939) ;
Continental Cas. Co. v. Pierce, 170 Miss. 67, 154 So. 279 (1934) ;Standard Surety
& Cas. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 100 N.Y.S.2d 79 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ; Walls V.
Gaines, 46 Pa. D. & C. 327 (1943) ; Clinton Cotton Oil Co. v. Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co., 180 S.C. 459, 186 S.E. 399 (1936) ; Birrenkott v. .McManamay,
65 S.D. 581, 276 N.W. 725 (1937) ; Vaughn v. Standard Surety & Cas. Co., 27
Tenn. App. 671, 184 S.W.2d 556 (1944) ; Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Wachsmith, 2 Wash.2d 679, 99 P.2d 420 (1940) ; Shaweroft v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co.,
177 Wash. 106, 30 P.2d 987 (1934) ; Narloch v. Church, 234 Wis. 155, 290 N.W.
595 (1940) ; Madison v. Steller, 226 Wis. 86, 275 N.W. 703 (1937) ; Bernard v.
Wisconsin Ins. Co., 210 Wis. 133, 245 N.W. 200 (1932).
The term "insured" has been construed severally in Ginder v. Harleysville
Mut. Cas. Co., 49 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1942), affirmed, 135 F.2d 215 (3d Cir.
1943) ; Kaifer v. Georgia Cas. Co., 67 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1933) ; New v. General
Cas. Co. of America, 133 F. Supp. 955 (D.C. Tenn. 1955) ; Pleasant Valley Lima
Bean Growers and Warehouse Ass'n v. Cal-Farm Ins. Co., 298 P.2d 109 (Cal.
1956); Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v. Smith, 76 N.W.2d 486 (Minn. 1956) ; Farm
Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Manson, 94 N.H. 389, 54 A.2d 580 (1947) ;
Montgomery v. Keystone Mut. Cas. Co., 357 Pa. 223, 53 A.2d 539 (1947) ; Walls
v. Gaines, 46 Pa. D. & C. 327 (1943) ; Ayres v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 172
Va. 383, 3 S.E.2d 303 (1939) ; Severin v. Luchinske, 271 Wis. 378, 73 N.W.2d
477 (1955) ; Zippel v. Country Gardens, Inc., 262 Wis. 567, 55 N.W.2d 903
(1952) ; McMann v. Faulstich, 259 Wis. 7, 47 N.W.2d 317 (1951) ; Buck v. Home
Mut. Cas. Co., 258 Wis. 538, 46 N.W.2d 749 (1951) ; Vick v. Brown, 255 Wis.
147, 38 N.W.2d 716 (1949) ; Employer's Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Tollefsen,
219 Wis. 434, 263 N.W. 376 (1935).
5. In this factual situation a majority of the courts construe the term "insured"
collectively: Getlin v. Maryland Cas. Co., 196 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1952) ; John-
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sured.6 A similar result would follow where the named insured
injuries an employee of an additional insured.7 Likewise, coverage is precluded when the named insured is liable for injury
inflicted by an additional insured on an employee of the named
insured.8
The majority of the court in the instant case construed the
term "insured" severally, that is, as applying only to the particular insured against whom claim was made under the policy.
The policy therefore provided coverage for the additional insured
who negligently killed the employee of the named insured. Most
son v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 104 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1939); Continental Cas.
Co. v. Pierce, 170 Miss. 67, 154 So. 279 (1934) ; Standard Surety & Cas. Co. v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 100 N.Y.S.2d 79 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ; Birrenkott v. McManamay,
65 S.D. 581, 276 N.W. 725 (1937) ; Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Wachsmith,
2 Wash.2d 679, 99 P.2d 420 (1940) ; Shawcroft v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 177
Wash. 106, 30 P.2d 987 (1934) ; Norloch v. Church, 234 Wis. 155, 290 N.W. 595
(1940) ; Madison v. Steller, 226 Wis. 86, 275 N.W. 703 (1937) ; Bernard v. Wisconsin Ins. Co., 210 Wis. 133, 245 N.W. 200 (1932).
The minority adopts the "several" construction: Ginder v. Harleysville Mut.
Cas. Co., 49 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1942), affirmed, 135 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1943) ;
Kaifer v. Georgia Cas. Co., 67 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1933) ; Pleasant Valley Lima
Bean Growers and Warehouse Ass'n v. Cal-Farm Ins. Co., 298 P.2d 109 (Cal.
1956) ; Walls v. Gaines, 46 Pa. D. & C. 327 (1943) ; Ayres v. Harleysville Mut.
Cas. Co., 172 Va. 383, 3 S.E.2d 303 (1939) ; Zippel v. Country Gardens, Inc.,
262 Wis. 567, 55 N.W.2d 903 (1952) ; MeMann v. Faulstich, 259 Wis. 7, 47
N.W.2d 317 (1951).
6. Brandt v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 228 Wis. 328, 280 N.W. 403
(1938), overruled, Sandstrom v. Clausen, 258 Wis. 534, 46 N.W.2d 831 (1951) ;
Merchants Mut. Cas. Co. v. Tuttle, 98 N.H. 349, 101 A.2d 262 (1953) (an employee who injures a co-employee when the named insured is not the common
employer is precluded from coverage). However, in this situation when the named
insured is claiming coverage for his liability, "insured" applies to each insured
severally, and coverage is afforded. New v. General Cas. Co. of America, 133 F.
Supp. 955 (D.C. Tenn. 1955) ; Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v. Smith, 76 N.W.2d 486
(Minn. 1956).
7. No decisions have been found supporting this proposition, but Wisconsin,
the only court which has been confronted with this problem, has held the insurer
liable. Sandstrom v. Clausen's Estate, 258 Wis. 534, 46 N.W.2d 831 (1951)
Vick v. Brown, 255 Wis. 148, 38 N.W.2d 716 (1949). This same court in different factual situations has construed the term "insured" collectively and denied
coverage. Madison v. Steller, 226 Wis. 86, 275 N.W. 703 (1937) (where additional insured injures employee of named insured no coverage) ; Bernard v. Wisconsin Ins. Co., 210 Wis. 133, 245 N.W. 200 (1932). But see McMann v. Faulstich, 259 Wis. 7, 47 N.W.2d 317 (1951) (additional insured who injures employee of named insured is covered). The latter case overrules the Madison and
Bernard cases in result. The court in McMann indicates that the relationship
between the plaintiff and the named insured is immaterial. The only thing that
is material is the relationship between the plaintiff and the party being sued.
The Wisconsin court affirmed this position in Severin v. Luchinske, 271 Wis. 378,
73 N.W.2d 477 (1955) and Zippel v. Country Gardens Inc., 262 Wis. 567, 55
N.W.2d 903 (1952).
8. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 136 F.2d 807 (8th Cir.
1943) ; Clinton Cotton Oil Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 180 S.C.
459, 186 S.E. 399 (1936) ; Vaughn v. Standard Surety and Casualty Co., 27 Tenn.
App. 671, 184 S.W.2d 556 (1944).
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of the cases involving this factual situation have adopted a contrary construction.9
The automobile liability insurer utilizes the employee and
workmen's compensation exclusions to exclude protection for injuries to employees of the insured, thereby decreasing its risk
and permitting a reduced premium rate. The company avoids
penalizing all policyholders for the increased risk of a few since
the great majority have no employees. 10 Two considerations indicate that the presence or absence of an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the insured for whom coverage is
claimed, not the relationship between the plaintiff and named
insured, was intended to determine the application of these exclusions. First,the company generally intends to afford the same
protection to an additional insured as to the named insured.1
In the instant case the dissent insisted that the court's interpretation of the term "insured" afforded the additional insured
greater protection than is afforded the named insured, and from
that premise argued against the majority's interpretation. While
it is true that under the court's interpretation, and the facts of
the case, the additional insured was not excluded from coverage
although the named insured would have been if he had been the
tortfeasor, this does not mean that the exclusionary clauses were
construed so as to favor one over the other. If an employee of
Mitchell (the additional insured) instead of an employee of the
named insured had been injured in the accident through the negligence of the named insured, the effect of the clauses on the
parties would have been reversed. Mitchell would have been
liable for workmen's compensation and would not have been
covered under the liability policy, while the named insured would
have been covered thereby. 1 2 Second, the purpose of the omnibus
clause is to create insurance in favor of another, not to limit
9. See note 5 oupra.
10. APPLEMAN, AUTOMOBILE

LIABILITY INSURANCE 196, 197

(1938).

11. The exception to this principle is the cross-employee exclusion to the
omnibus clause which states: "This policy does not apply when an employee kills
or injures an employee of the same employer."
12. If the the employee of Mitchell had the status of a borrowed employee,
Southern, the borrowing employer, would be liable to pay compensation to the
borrowed employee.

MALONE,

LOUISIANA

WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

LAW AND

PRACTICE 61 (1951). Since the borrowed employee would then be in an-employment relationship with the named insured (Southern), the exclusionary clauses
would seemingly preclude coverage for Southern. Further, if Mitchell were an
Independent contractor of Southern, the workmen's compensation exclusion would
preclude coverage to the named insured in those states which impose liability upon
the employer to the employees of contractors. APPLEMAN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY
INSURANCE 196, 197 (1938).
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protection of the named insured. 18 Under the collective construction as proposed by the dissent, the named insured would be

afforded less protection in consequence of the inclusion of the
omnibus clause than in the absence of such a clause. The named
insured would be denied coverage when the injured is an employee of an additional insured as, for example, when the named
insured is driving his vehicle in the course of his employment
and negligently injures a fellow employee. In these circumstances the common employer, as one responsible for the automobile's operation, would be an additional insured. 14 Since he
would also be liable to the injured employee under workmen's
compensation, he would be excluded from coverage by the provision in question.
The cases discussed herein involve the 1947 or earlier standard provisions. The question should be largely laid at rest by
the 1955 standard provisions (now in use but under which no
reported cases have been discovered) which expressly provide
that the term "insured" is used severally and not collectively. If
this does not sufficiently support the majority of the court and
emphasize the true underwriting intention, the September 1,

1956, standard family automobile policy should suffice. It provides that the "insurance afforded ... applies separately to each
insured against whom claim is made or suit is brought." Insurance authorities contend that this has always been the under15
writer's intention.
Milton L. Duvieilh, Jr.
13. New v. General Cas. Co. of America, 133 F. Supp. 955 (D.C. Tenn. 1955).
14. The usual omnibus clause in an automobile liability policy is expressly
made to apply to any person or organization "legally responsible" for the use of
the vehicle. Ordinarly the person operating the car is "legally responsible" for
the operation of the same, within the meaning of the omnibus clause. Hawkeye
Cas. Co. v. Rose, 181 F.2d 157 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Ronan, 37
F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1930). Where the named insured is operating his car in the
course of his employment, his employer is "legally responsible" for the operation
of the automobile and hence an additional insured under the omnibus clause of the
policy. Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v. Smith, 76 N.W.2d 486 (Minn. 1956) ; Sandstrom
v. Clausen, 258 Wis. 534, 46 N.W.2d 831 (1951). But where a state is the employer, the state is not legally liable and therefore not an additional insured.
Narloch v. Church, 234 Wis. 155, 290 N.W. 595 (1940).
15. Risjord & Austin, Standard Family Automobile Policy, 411 INs. L.J. 202,
(1957) (the intention of the underwriters has always been that where a policy
would or might apply to several insureds, the unqualified term "insured," as used,
in the exclusions of the policy, meant only the person claiming coverage). See also,
Breen, The New Automobile Policy, 388 INs. L.J. 333 (1955).

